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Should there be a female age limit on public funding for assisted reproductive technology (ART)? The
question bears significant economic and sociopolitical implications and has been contentious in many
countries. We conceptualise the question as one of justice in resource allocation, using three much-debated
substantive principles of justice—the capacity to benefit, personal responsibility, and need—to structure and
then explore a complex of arguments. Capacity-to-benefit arguments are not decisive: There are no clear costeffectiveness grounds to restrict funding to those older women who still bear some capacity to benefit from
ART. Personal responsibility arguments are challenged by structural determinants of delayed motherhood.
Nor are need arguments decisive: They can speak either for or against a female age limit, depending on the
conception of need used. We demonstrate how these principles can differ not only in content but also in the
relative importance they are accorded by governments. Wide variation in ART public funding policy might be
better understood in this light. We conclude with some inter-country comparison. New Zealand and Swedish
policies are uncommonly transparent and thus demonstrate particularly well how the arguments we explore
have been put into practice.
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Abstract Should there be a female age limit on public funding for assisted
reproductive technology (ART)? The question bears significant economic and
sociopolitical implications and has been contentious in many countries. We
conceptualise the question as one of justice in resource allocation, using three muchdebated substantive principles of justice—the capacity to benefit, personal
responsibility, and need—to structure and then explore a complex of arguments.
Capacity-to-benefit arguments are not decisive: There are no clear cost-effectiveness
grounds to restrict funding to those older women who still bear some capacity to
benefit from ART. Personal responsibility arguments are challenged by structural
determinants of delayed motherhood. Nor are need arguments decisive: They can
speak either for or against a female age limit, depending on the conception of need
used. We demonstrate how these principles can differ not only in content but also in
the relative importance they are accorded by governments. Wide variation in ART
public funding policy might be better understood in this light. We conclude with some
inter-country comparison. New Zealand and Swedish policies are uncommonly
transparent and thus demonstrate particularly well how the arguments we explore
have been put into practice.

Keywords Reproductive techniques, assisted; Ethical analysis; Distributive justice;
Health care rationing; Health policy; Need; Capacity to benefit; Disinvestment

Introduction
Levels of public funding for assisted reproductive technology (ART) vary widely
internationally. Some countries do not publicly fund ART at all, while others do so to
different degrees and for different sub-populations (Chambers et al., 2009). Many
countries that do publicly fund ART do so with a female age limit. For example,
women over the following ages usually cannot access ART public funding in their
respective countries: 37, the Southern Health Care Region of Sweden (Lindström and
Waldau 2008); 39, New Zealand (Farquhar, Wang, and Sullivan 2010); 39, United
Kingdom (National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health 2004);
45 (or 51 with donor oocytes), Israel (Birenbaum-Carmeli and Dirnfeld 2008, 184).
By contrast, Australia’s ART public funding policy may be unique in the world in not
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featuring any female age limit (Assisted Reproductive Technologies Review
Committee 2006, 50). Should there be a female age limit on ART public funding?

The question is important for at least two reasons. First, it may have significant
economic implications for the health care system of the country concerned. For
instance, Australian expenditure on Medicare benefits for ART increased from
AUD39.3 million in 2000 to AUD248.3 million in 2009 (Medicare Item Reports
n.d.).1 The sustainability of such expenditure is questionable. A female age limit on
ART public funding represents one means by which to curb expenditure. Indeed,
savings would increase as ART is increasingly sought by older women. In 1992, 9.3
percent of all women initiating in vitro fertilisation (IVF) cycles in Australia and New
Zealand were aged 40 and over (Lancaster, Shafir, and Huang 1995).2 By 2007, this
proportion had steadily increased to 22.8 percent (Wang et al. 2009).3 The question of
a female age limit on ART public funding also bears significant sociopolitical
implications. It raises questions of discrimination. Is a female age limit on ART
public funding discriminatory—on the basis of sex, age, or medical condition? Does it
discriminate between individuals on the basis of a characteristic that is properly
irrelevant in the prevailing context, therein perpetrating an injustice?
Watt et al. chronicle how “the public subsidy of ART has been a perennially
contentious health policy issue in Australia” (2011, 201), just as it has been in other
countries. In this paper, we invite consideration of the possibility that historical and
geographical variation in ART public funding policy reflects underlying variation in
conceptions of justice when it comes to resource allocation.
Mladovsky and Sorenson (2010) review a number of differing government rationales
for ART public funding and its multivarious restriction. Governments often fail to
make explicit these rationales, and so too their underlying conceptions of justice.
There is a recognised need for research into these (Mladovsky and Sorenson 2010),
and we intend this paper to contribute toward meeting that need. We conceptualise the
question of whether there should be a female age limit on ART public funding as one
1

These amounts use calendar years and combine benefits paid under ART Medicare item numbers

13200, 13203, 13206, 13209, 13212, 13215, 13218, and 13221.
2

9.3 percent = (451 + 54) / (4,878 + 572)
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In order to observe the steadiness of the increase, see intervening reports, all available at

http://www.npsu.unsw.edu.au/preruweb.nsf/page/Assisted+Reproduction+Technology+Reports.
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of justice in resource allocation and confine the scope of our paper accordingly. While
the paper may prompt still more fundamental questions concerning the nature of
medicine and the scope of citizens’ responsibilities to one another, it will not address
these directly. We also limit the paper’s discussion to ART that is intended to
overcome what is normally understood by “medical” or “clinical” infertility, i.e., a
man and a woman experiencing difficulty in achieving a live birth. When ART is used
for different reasons, female age may well be relevant in different ways and to
different degrees.
We begin by exploring a complex of arguments for and against a female age limit on
ART public funding. We bring order to that complex by expounding each argument
under the heading of “capacity to benefit,” “personal responsibility,” or “need.” These
terms are common in just resource allocation theory, but they are often used
differently. Some theorists (Mooney and Houston 2004) fully equate “capacity to
benefit” with “need,” while others do not (Cookson and Dolan 2000; Culyer 2001,
2007; Hope, Osterdal, and Hasman 2010). In this paper, we treat all three terms as
provisionally distinct and explore some of their contested meanings.
Toward the end of the paper, we summarise the different ART public funding policies
of Australia, New Zealand, and the Southern Health Care Region of Sweden, then
articulate these more formally in terms of the arguments we explore. The New
Zealand and Swedish policies are uncommonly explicit about their rationales and
even their underlying conceptions of justice. As such, they demonstrate particularly
well how the arguments we explore have been put into practice. When compared with
Australian policy, they also demonstrate how policy can be underpinned by different
conceptions of justice.
We conclude by formulating questions with which, in light of our exploration, the
question of ART resource allocation might be equated. In short, how should a
government conceptualise—then assign relative levels of importance to—infertilityrelated need, infertility-related personal responsibility, and the capacity to benefit by
ART rather than some other form of help? Variation in ART public funding policy
might be better understood as reflecting different answers to this question.

Principles of Justice: The Capacity to Benefit, Personal Responsibility, and Need
Aristotle’s principle of justice—equals should be treated equally—is merely formal
insofar as it declines to specify precisely who are equals (Beauchamp and Childress
5

2009). In just resource allocation theory and practice—relating both to ART and to
health care more broadly—equals have been variously identified by, among other
things, their capacity to benefit from treatment, their degree of personal responsibility
for their health problem, and their degree of need (Beauchamp and Childress 2009;
Cookson and Dolan 2000). In other words, the following has been variously asserted:


Equals in their capacity to benefit from treatment should be treated equally.



Equals in their degree of personal responsibility for their health problem
should be treated equally.



Equals in their degree of need should be treated equally.

In this way, the capacity to benefit, personal responsibility, and need represent not
merely formal but, by contrast, material or substantive principles of justice, principles
by which resources might be justly allocated.4 We now use these three substantive
principles of justice to differentiate and explore arguments for and against a female
age limit on ART public funding.

Capacity-to-Benefit Arguments
Reduced Cost-Effectiveness
Perhaps the most widely used argument in favour of some female age restriction on
ART public funding goes as follows: ART success rates decline with female age. In
this way, older women can be said to demonstrate a comparatively reduced capacity
to benefit from ART. This results in ART being less cost-effective for older women.
By itself, this does not commend restriction; the argument must continue as follows:
When undertaken by older women, ART is insufficiently cost-effective insofar as
resources might have been used to greater effect.
In order to more thoroughly assess this argument, we must first canvass relevant
empirical data. Australia’s Assisted Reproductive Technologies Review Committee
observed that “[t]here is undisputed evidence that [female] age is the single most
important factor in determining the success of ART” (2006, 67). In this paper, we
define ART success as a live delivery (live birth). Figure 1 plots the success rate of
autologous in vitro fertilisation (IVF) cycles declining with female age. (In autologous
cycles, women use their own oocytes, not those of a donor.) The trend, if not quite its
4

“Justly” might be substituted with “fairly,” “equitably,” or even “best” without changing the intended

meaning.
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magnitude, is shared by fresh and frozen-thaw cycles alike: The success rate
decreases as female age increases. A large body of evidence confirms this trend, in
which the age of the woman at the point of oocyte retrieval appears to most heavily
influence the probability of treatment success (Watt et al. 2011). A lower probability
of treatment success can be regarded as a smaller capacity to benefit from treatment.
The success rates of donor cycles tend not to differ with female age, i.e., the age of
the oocyte recipient. This significantly weakens capacity-to-benefit arguments for a
female age limit in the case of donor cycles. Israel’s age limit of 45 or 51 with donor
oocytes likely registers this. However, the use of donor oocytes also introduces
additional ethical considerations that make it an exception to the rule of declining
success rates, which this paper does not have space to adequately address. For
example, conflicts of interest may exist between the clinician, donor, and recipient
(Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2009). Also,
given particular financial arrangements, “the welfare of the fee-paying recipient
patient may be placed above that of the egg donor” (Heng 2008, 414). Furthermore,
parties may disagree concerning the disclosure of the donor’s identify (Burr and
Reynolds 2008)—both to the recipient and to the child. The donor must risk her
health without personal benefit: Is this problematic? How can we ensure that donation
is sufficiently informed and voluntary (Black 2010)? Ought donation also to be
reimbursed? If so, then how can donors be recruited without exploitation (Kalbian
2011) and without the commodification of oocytes (Blyth 2002)? Do we wrong a
child by wilfully giving it life at some distance from one of its genetic parents (Frame
2008)? What risks does donation pose to relationships, both relationships among
partners and relationships with the child?
When both successful and unsuccessful cycles are considered, the resources required
to achieve a live birth by means of ART increase substantially with female age.
Griffiths et al. (2010) estimated that the incremental monetary cost of achieving a live
birth on the first cycle of treatment ranged from AUD27,373 for women aged 30–33
to AUD130,951 for women aged 42–45. For estimates comparable in trend and
magnitude, see Chambers (2006).
From a certain perspective—one trained foremost on allocative efficiency—ART for
older women can seem to represent a poor use of public funds. However, this
conclusion meets at least two counterarguments, even from within the perspective of
allocative efficiency: (1) ART for older women remains cost-effective relative to
7

other health care; (2) alternatively, the true cost-effectiveness of ART is unusually
difficult to determine due to conceptual difficulties. We now explore each of these
counterarguments in turn.
Other things being equal, ART may well be less cost-effective when undertaken by
older women, but nonetheless it may remain highly cost-effective relative to other
health care (in which case restriction would not be warranted). The following costeffectiveness analysis certainly suggests this.
Griffiths et al. (2010) found that the incremental cost per live birth at a maternal age
of 42–45 years and on a second treatment cycle was AUD187,515. This was the
largest figure in their base case analysis (their “worst-case” scenario). Australian life
expectancy at birth is 81.5 years per person (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008).
Therefore, even when least effective, the incremental cost of ART per life-year gained
is a mere AUD2,301 (AUD187,515 / 81.5).
In calculating the benefit provided by any health care, we may wish to incorporate
some preference for current over future health. We might thereby apply a discount
rate to the future life-years gained by ART as a measure of the extent to which
individuals aggregated across society are willing to forgo current benefits in order to
obtain future ones. People who place less importance on future costs and outcomes
will apply a higher rate of discount.
Applying a customary 5 percent discount rate, 81.5 future life-years equates to 20.6
discounted life-years gained.5 Thus, the incremental cost per life-year gained now
equates to AUD9,103 (AUD187,515 / 20.6). In this light, ART appears somewhat less
cost-effective than it does above, when we do not apply a discount rate. Applying a 10
percent discount rate, ART appears less cost-effective again (AUD187,515 / 11.0 =
AUD17,047). However, even at this uncommonly high discount rate, ART compares
acceptably with other previously funded health care (notwithstanding complexities we
soon touch on). If Australia were considering a pharmaceutical for public funding, the
above amounts would likely be regarded as well within the range that the Australian
government is willing to pay for an additional life-year gained. Indeed, incremental
costs per life-year gained of up to AUD50,000 and more have been considered
acceptable, judging by past public funding decisions (Cleemput et al. 2011).
5

We calculate this by successively dividing future life-years by increasing powers of 1.05 and then

summing.
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ART’s life-year benefit should be offset according to the magnitude of any survival
and quality-of-life deficits observable over the lifespan relative to non-ART peers. If
we assume that, throughout life, some individuals born via ART suffer some qualityof-life deficit relative to their non-ART peers, then this will increase ART’s
incremental cost per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained. There is significant
debate concerning the relative health of those born via ART, but some current major
findings are as follows:


Children born following ART (particularly singletons) are at increased risk of
some birth defects compared to spontaneously conceived children (Hansen et
al. 2005; Reefhuis et al. 2009).



In singleton ART infants, there is an increased risk of perinatal mortality, low
birth weight, and preterm birth compared to singletons conceived
spontaneously; there are few differences in these outcomes between twins
conceived spontaneously and those conceived with ART (Bower and Hansen
2005).



No negative effect on neurodevelopmental outcomes (neuromotor, cognitive,
language, and behaviour outcomes) has been identified but studies with longer
follow-up are required (Middelburg et al. 2008).

The difficulties associated with undertaking such studies should be noted. For
instance, are the findings attributable to ART or to the underlying infertility? How
severe is the confounding conferred by multiple births? Do age, socioeconomic status,
or other parental attributes contribute to the findings? Studies with longer follow-up
are required, as are those that track the consequences of changing clinical practices
and new technologies (such as oocyte vitrification and preimplantation genetic
diagnosis). Current evidence may be too ambiguous to include in economic
evaluation. However, suppose that we do include it. While the magnitude of increased
risks for ART-born children is significant in relative terms, these risks are still very
small in absolute terms. As such, they are unlikely to greatly increase ART’s
incremental cost per QALY gained (just focusing on those QALYs gained by the
child). Therefore, even accommodating some quality-of-life deficit for those born via
ART, it is likely that we could still consider ART to represent comparatively good
value for money.

9

But what complicates and undermines the above cost-effectiveness analysis?
Mladovsky and Sorenson contend that the economic arguments for and against
publicly funding ART are currently inconclusive due to difficulties that are largely
conceptual: Economic assessments frequently fail “to sufficiently capture the broader
costs and benefits of IVF” (2010, 114). What are we to include among the benefits
and harms involved in both successful and unsuccessful ART? For instance, a lifeyear gained for a person who would not otherwise have existed (but for ART) may
differ conceptually in some important way from a life-year gained for a living person.
For instance, the benefit of 81.5 life-years mooted above does not in itself relate to the
benefit enjoyed by the infertile patient but rather to that enjoyed by his or her
offspring. Devlin and Parkin argue that ART’s benefit should be assessed in terms of
the increased quality of life enjoyed by those (already living) who undertake ART:
QALYs are intended to capture improvements in health among patients.
They are not appropriate for placing a value on additional lives. Additional
lives are not improvements in health; preventing someone’s death is not the
same as creating their life and it is not possible to improve the quality of life
of someone who has not been conceived by conceiving them. CUA [costutility analysis] might instead proceed by focusing on the health related
improvements in quality of life by prospective parents seeking treatment for
infertility (Devlin and Parkin 2003, S4).
A central question is whether to include among ART’s benefits those enjoyed by the
child, those enjoyed by the parents, or both. (The same question applies to ART’s
risks of harm, which might be counted negatively on the benefits side.) Including only
those benefits (and risks of harm) applicable to the parents (namely those already
living) has the potential to greatly reduce the cost-effectiveness of ART. This applies
to older and younger women alike. Conversely, ART would appear even more costeffective relative to other health care if its benefits were considered to include the sum
of quality-of-life improvements for patients in addition to the life-years gained for
children born. Therefore, much turns on what is included among ART’s benefits.
Any quality-of-life deficits should be counted negatively on the benefits side. These
might be accentuated for those patients whose ART fails, for instance. There is some
evidence (albeit limited) that leaving a program of treatment childless confers
“clinical[ly] relevant emotional problems” on a subset of women (Verhaak et al.
2007). Conversely, Ryan measured some psychological benefit “in going through the
10

service, even if you leave it childless” (1996, 196). Does the opportunity of trying for
a baby via ART, irrespective of the outcome, itself constitute a benefit?
Conceptual difficulties in ART cost-effectiveness analysis cut both ways, providing
reasons for caution in both availing and restricting ART funding solely on costeffectiveness grounds. However, if one chooses to proceed despite these difficulties,
then available cost-effectiveness analysis, combined with contestable assumptions on
the benefit achieved by ART, can be used to support the argument that ART for older
women remains sufficiently cost-effective relative to other health care.

Medical Futility
The generally reduced capacity of older women to benefit by ART is relevant to agerestriction debates not only for its negative impact on comparative cost-effectiveness
but also because it prompts questions about medical futility. These questions are
important because futile treatment can be considered not merely wasteful but
potentially harmful. We might venture that the providers (and funders) of futile
treatment wrong their patients and not simply those whom expended resources might
otherwise have helped. There is a marked conceptual—and, we would say, ethical—
difference between (1) prioritising one patient above another in order to maximise the
aggregated net benefit and (2) seeking to protect a patient from harms that are risked
merely for the sake of a vanishingly small probability of benefit.
At what point should ART be considered futile? How small must be the capacity to
benefit? That is, how small must be the probability of a live birth, or (better) the
increase in that probability, or the associated increase in the patient’s quality of life?
Australia’s Assisted Reproductive Technologies Review Committee contended that
[g]iven the success rate of less than 2 percent noted in the most recently
available age-specific data, it is not clinically appropriate to initiate a new
cycle of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment in women using their own eggs
at 44 years and over (2006, 16).6
The rationale of “clinical appropriateness” implies a concern to avoid treatment that is
futile and not merely cost-ineffective. Considering harms and the point at which they
ought not to be risked for only very small benefits can strengthen the argument for
6

Australian ART public funding policy is itself silent on this issue. As we explain below, Medicare

covers part of the cost of all ART that an appropriate clinician deems to be medically needed.
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some female age restriction on ART public funding. However, in attempting to assess
the magnitude of potential harms and benefits, we run into the same conceptual
difficulties facing cost-effectiveness analysis. We also run into a surprising lack of
empirical data on the age-relative risks of harm that ART may incur (Bewley, Foo,
and Braude 2011; Watt et al. 2011). (Independent of ART, older women face greater
risks of complications when pregnant. Independent of female age, ART poses
particular risks. In this way, a linked-evidence approach could be used as part of an
assessment of ART’s risks of harm.)

Personal Responsibility Arguments
What personal responsibility do we bear for our health and how, if at all, should this
impact on how our health needs are assessed and prioritised in the provision of public
funding? This is a contentious question. Older women may be held personally
responsible for their diminished fertility to the degree that some chosen deferral
contributed to it. Their claim on public funding may thereby be undermined. This
broadly equates to a fair-innings argument of the kind “you had your chance.” It
might also lead to an argument concerning moral hazard, in the economic sense: By
rescuing those whose chosen delays have contributed to diminished fertility, does
ART public funding for older women thereby encourage more people to make the
same risky choices?
Though defensible, these arguments should guard against callousness. They should
also consider what Steele calls “underlying structural determinants of older
motherhood and foreshortened reproductive careers” (2011, 1). Prominent among
these determinants may be “economic uncertainty for young people in Western
countries,” considered in the light of, among other things, “non-permanent
employment arrangements for individuals and, where relevant, their partners; higher
education debt; and the high cost of home ownership (and consequent delay in, or
nonattainment of, first home ownership).” Such structural determinants, or risk factors
for delayed childbearing, challenge arguments that presume a full, and thereby fully
accountable, reproductive freedom.

Need Arguments
Questions concerning personal responsibility for one’s medical needs tend to depend
on answers to more fundamental questions: namely, questions concerning how
12

medicine should conceptualise, and accordingly prioritise, different needs and
capacities to benefit. When is one need greater than another? In other words, what
constitutes a medical need? One answer to this question speaks in favour of some
female age restriction on ART public funding, while alternative answers speak against
such restriction.

Reduced Disruption to Normal Health
On one conception, need increases with the degree of disruption to normal health.
Daniels (1985) has proposed that normal health, in turn, should be conceptualised in
terms of “species-typical functioning” or the “normal opportunity range” that, as a
species, human beings demonstrate. Hope, Osterdal, and Hasman expand on this
conception of need: Person A needs health care X “in order to function normally: that
is, above some critical, or threshold, level” (2010, 473). (Notably, this formulation
gives more scope to a culturally relative threshold.) We can apply the work of Hope et
al. to the context of infertility: An infertile person’s need can be proportionally related
to the normal probability of a live birth minus the person’s specific probability of a
live birth (all without ART).
Along these lines, it might be argued that infertile younger women generally stand in
greater need than infertile older women because, for younger women, the normal (or
population average) probability of a live birth is generally higher than it is for older
women. In other words, diminished fertility is more normal in older women, therefore
the disruption to normal health that it betokens—and the corollary medical need that
arises—is comparatively reduced. This argument depends on:
(1) a view that medicine ought to restore health to normal levels but not take it
beyond these levels, at least on some fundamentals; and
(2) an endorsement of declining fertility with female age as one such fundamental
or, in other words, as important to a degree that medicine would do wrong not to
defer to it in some way.
Both (1) and (2) are defensible, though contestable and philosophically involved
(Carter and Braunack-Mayer 2011).

Equally Important Opportunity
On a competing view, medicine ought to aid people in need without reference to the
normal or the natural. It ought to act simply out of mercy, for instance, or in line with
13

social norms. On this view, medicine ought to overcome not so much disruptions in
normal health but, for instance, limits to important opportunities. Relative to infertile
younger women, then, infertile older women stand in equal, not reduced, need by
virtue of the fact that the opportunity to have a child may be equally important for
them.
A need, such as that for a child, might be taken to exist whenever someone testifies to
it with sufficient moral force. This might be to say “whenever it would strike us as
merciless or cruel to deny the need.” In this way, women might lay claim to a need
that is independent of age. Likewise, even some relegation of fertility from the status
of need to that of mere desire might weaken equally the claims of older and younger
women on ART public funding.
Rawlins and Culyer suggest that sound claims exist “to give a higher priority to novel
treatments for conditions for which no alternative specific forms of therapy are
currently available, or to conditions associated with social stigma” (2004, 226).
Rawlins and Culyer imply that, in such cases, need is accentuated and that, as such, it
is especially important for cost-effectiveness analysis not to dominate decisionmaking. It can be argued that ART is a novel treatment, with no direct comparator,
and that infertility is associated with social stigma (Slade et al. 2007). On both of
these scores, younger and older women may stand equally in need.

Increased Severity and Increased Urgency
The severity of a problem may be taken to increase, by degree, the medical need that
exists in light of it. Relative to younger women, older women generally suffer an
increased severity of infertility by virtue of their lower probability of a live birth
without ART. In this regard, they may lay claim to an increased need. Hope et al.
identify in such thinking the “poor initial state” conception of need: Person A needs
health care X “in order to avoid harm” (Hope, Osterdal, and Hasman 2010, 473).
Again, applying the work of Hope et al. to the context of infertility, an infertile
person’s need can be proportionally related to the number one minus the person’s
specific probability of a live birth without ART (expressed as 0.3, say). The number
one signifies the best imaginable health and, on this conception of need, replaces
normal health (or the normal probability of a live birth without ART), which the
“normal functioning range” conception of need used (Hope, Osterdal, and Hasman
2010, 473).
14

Furthermore, an older woman’s lower probability of a live birth with ART, not
without it, may be precisely the thing to entitle her to more, and not less, funding (in
the form of additional funded treatment cycles, for instance). This can follow the
egalitarian aim of trying to return everyone to an equal (fertility) footing, which may
underlie ART funding in the first place.
The severity of infertility may also be regarded as proportional to its duration. Here,
too, older women may lay claim to a greater severity of infertility (and therein need) if
they have generally been infertile for longer.
Like the severity of a problem, the urgency of a problem may be taken to increase, by
degree, the medical need that exists in light of it. On average, an older woman’s
probabilities of a live birth, both without ART and with it, drop more quickly than do
those of a younger woman. In this respect, an older woman’s need for treatment can
be regarded as more urgent and, therein, greater. Furthermore, menopause may be
seen as a critical threshold. If medicine ought only to restore “species-typical
functioning” (Daniels 1985), then it ought not to extend female fertility beyond its
“species-typical” endpoint. If menopause is seen as a critical threshold in this respect,
then a woman’s need for ART may become more urgent, and therefore greater, the
closer she approaches that threshold.

Interactions Between Capacity-to-Benefit and Need Arguments
Thus far, we have explored a series of arguments for and against a female age limit on
ART public funding. We have done so largely in relation to concepts of the capacity
to benefit and need. Complexities exist not only within each of these concepts, but
also in their potential interactions. For instance:
Person A stands to benefit more by treatment X than person B. A therein
needs X more than B, though B may need some form of help more than A.
Here is a variation on this observation:
You cannot ever need futile treatment. Though you need help, you do not
need that help.
If we accept this observation and the conception of need that it implies, then older
women generally need ART less than younger women precisely by virtue of their
reduced capacity to benefit (considered in terms of lower probabilities of a live birth).
The conception of need at work in this observation is consistent with the “significant
gain” conception of need identified by Hope et al.: Person A needs health care X “in
15

order to improve health significantly” (Hope, Osterdal, and Hasman 2010, 473).
Again, applying their work to the context of infertility, an infertile person’s need can
be proportionally related to the person’s specific probability of a live birth with ART
minus the person’s specific probability of a live birth without ART. Here, need is
essentially identified with, or reduced to, the capacity to benefit from treatment.

How Policies Incorporate These Arguments
In the next section, we demonstrate how three current ART funding policies
incorporate the above arguments in the form of a range of criteria that any claim on
ART public funding must either meet or be prioritised against. As such, we focus on
different ways in which female age has been considered relevant (or irrelevant) to the
just allocation of resources within the context of ART. We examine in turn the
different policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the Southern Health Care Region of
Sweden. First, we describe key policy elements, and then we articulate each policy
more formally in terms of the arguments explored above.

Australia
Australia’s Assisted Reproductive Technologies Review Committee observed that
“Australia appears to be unique in not limiting access to funding for ART services”
(2006, 50). On its own, this comment is misleading. ART funding continues to be
limited in Australia on at least three fronts. First, funding is officially available for
medical infertility only. (In practice, this requirement is interpreted differently by
different health care providers.) Second, a co-payment is frequently required: Patientborne out-of-pocket costs vary across clinics, ranging from near-zero to
approximately AUD2,500 for the first full cycle in a year, AUD2,000 for subsequent
cycles, and AUD1,000 for frozen-thaw cycles (Repromed n.d.). By comparison,
government expenditure is approximately AUD2,600–2,900 for an individual’s first
full treatment cycle in a year, AUD2,500–2,800 for each subsequent cycle, and
AUD600 for frozen-thaw cycles (MBS Online n.d.). Third, for any one person,
funding is capped annually but not over the course of a lifetime. (Reimbursement
under the Extended Medicare Safety Net is capped annually; base reimbursement
under the Medicare Benefits Scheme is not.)
Australian ART funding policy features no reference to female age. Nowhere is the
capacity to benefit from ART referenced. Implicitly, then, that capacity is either
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neglected, actively rejected as irrelevant, or accommodated within the view that ART
is always worthy of funding on grounds of allocative efficiency. Futile ART is
presumed to be avoided by good medical practice and not funding policy.
Australian ART funding varies neither with a person’s capacity to benefit nor with
one’s degree of need. All women are implicitly accepted as equally in need provided
that they or their male partner are medically infertile. The conception of medical need
implicit is one of “normal functioning range,” with the normal range being identified
with perfect fertility before (normal) menopause.
In contrast to Australia, both New Zealand and the Southern Health Care Region of
Sweden restrict the amount of ART public funding that is available to an individual
over a lifetime. Moreover, they restrict eligibility for funding partly on costeffectiveness grounds, using numerous criteria that are both explicit and (what is
rarer) explicitly justified. Among these criteria, female age figures heavily, primarily
due to its impact on ART cost-effectiveness.

New Zealand
Since 2000, New Zealand has used a range of criteria to score a person’s claim on
ART public funding (Gillett, Peek, and Herbison 2012). The current criteria include:
chance of pregnancy without treatment (or “diagnosis”); female age; duration of
infertility; number of children; and sterilisation status (Farquhar, Wang, and Sullivan
2010; Gillett, Peek, and Herbison 2012). Only claims that reach the threshold score
receive funding, which covers a maximum of two treatment cycles in total. Gillett and
Peek, who first devised the scoring system, explain that: “It is intended to benefit
those who are most in need of therapy, but balanced by a system that will ensure
maximum benefit” (2000, 24). In other words, justice is regarded as adequately
achieved when, other things being equal, equal funding is given to those with an equal
need and an equal capacity to benefit.
It is not clear which criteria are intended to score need. On our interpretation, a
person’s need is scored by first calculating the probability of pregnancy without ART
(or “diagnosis”) using a separate, more clinically detailed scorecard. In this way, the
New Zealand scoring system implicitly accepts the argument that, next to younger
women, older women stand in increased need when they demonstrate a lower chance
of falling pregnant without ART. This suggests that a “poor initial state” conception
of need is in tow. The need score is then, in effect, later modified under (at least) the
17

criterion of duration of infertility. If this is the case, then the New Zealand scoring
system also accepts the argument that, next to younger women, older women stand in
greater need if they have been infertile for longer.
Gillett et al. report that female age was the only criterion to cause “considerable
disquiet in the public submissions that preceded” introduction of the scoring system:
“The main argument was that older women had the most urgent need” (Gillett, Peek,
and Herbison 2012, 139). On its own, the New Zealand scoring system does not
accept this argument. A person is afforded ART public funding when one reaches the
threshold score and not before. A projected decrease in the probability of pregnancy,
both with and without ART, only decreases the time required for the threshold score
to be reached—it does not change the score itself. However, Gillett et al. report that
ART public funding is sometimes provided under “clinical override,” when
exceptions are made in view of system imperfections (Gillett, Peek, and Herbison
2012, 135). Clinical override is applied (less than 10 percent of the time) when, for
instance, waiting for points to accumulate would sufficiently decrease the probability
of treatment success. In practice, clinical override enables a clinician to accept the
argument that older women stand in greater need in cases of increased urgency.
In New Zealand, need-based arguments are outweighed by a capacity-to-benefit
argument, however. Gillett and Peek proposed that “criteria should give preference to
those who are most likely to benefit,” therefore “factors that are known to have an
influence on the probability of a successful outcome ... should be heavily weighted in
the point system” (1997, 20). The sole criterion of female age is used to estimate and
correspondingly score the probability of treatment success (listed as pregnancy, not a
live birth). In calculating the strength of claims on ART public funding, women are
allocated point-multipliers of 1.0, 0.5, or 0.1 if their age is ≤ 39, 40–41, or ≥ 42,
respectively. Theoretically, then, a 39-year-old woman is 10 times more likely to
receive ART public funding than her 42-year-old counterpart. While the New Zealand
scoring system is designed to use female age as a prioritising criterion, in practice
female age functions as a threshold criterion: Current funding levels dictate a
threshold of 65 points—only women aged 39 years and under can score as much and
thereby access ART public funding.
Gillett and Peek have explicitly stated that the point-multipliers are intended to reflect
the probability of treatment success and not the degree of need (which, on one
argument above, is generally higher for younger women by virtue of infertility
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constituting for them an increased disruption in normal health) (Gillett and Peek 1997;
Gillett, Peek, and Herbison 2012). As such, the New Zealand scoring system, with
what functions as an age limit, implicitly accepts the argument that, by virtue of their
reduced capacity to benefit by ART, older women use ART resources at too great an
opportunity cost; that is, those same resources might benefit other (younger) women
more. Implicit in the funding threshold of 65 points is also a rejection of the argument
that the capacity of older women to benefit by ART is, though less than that of
younger women, nonetheless sufficient to justify expenditure in view of its costeffectiveness relative to other forms of health care.
Gillett, Peek, and Herbison (2012) suggest that the capacity to benefit from treatment
is captured by two criteria taken together, namely female age (as a proxy for the
chance of pregnancy with treatment) and the chance of pregnancy without treatment
(which, above, we identify with need). Analysing both treatment and non-treatment
outcomes, Gillett et al. demonstrate that the New Zealand scoring system largely
succeeds in selecting for funding (1) those who are most likely to achieve a live birth
with ART and (2) those who are least likely to achieve a live birth without ART.7 The
scoring system is thereby largely effective in using as a substantive principle of
justice the capacity to benefit from treatment. Gillett et al. implicitly regard ART’s
benefit as an increase in the probability of a live birth.

The Southern Health Care Region of Sweden
The Southern Health Care Region of Sweden uses a range of threshold (not
prioritising) criteria in order to allocate ART public funding. The criteria include:
female age; male age; female body mass index (BMI); follicle-stimulating hormone
(FSH) level; duration of infertility; number of children; and previous ART funding
(Lindström and Waldau 2008). In order to qualify for funding, women must be aged
37 or under. The “guiding principle” behind this criterion is openly identified as
“[c]ost-effectiveness combined with a normal-deviant scale” (Lindström and Waldau
2008, 182). In other words, evidence of differing cost-effectiveness (owing to
differing effectiveness) is explicitly cited as justification for the age limit. Older
women are thereby, as in New Zealand, denied funding on the basis of their reduced
7

An Australia−New Zealand comparison of ART success rates can be cited in support of (1) (Farquhar

et al. 2010).
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capacity to benefit and the opportunity cost that this entails. Implicit again within the
broader Swedish policy is a rejection of the argument that ART for older women is
sufficiently cost-effective relative to other health care. Older women are also denied
funding by reference to “a normal–deviant scale.” Offered in explanation of this
phrase is the reasoning: “At higher age[s women are] closer to [the] natural fertility
limit” (Lindström and Waldau 2008, 182). This implies acceptance of the argument
that infertility in older women represents less of a deviation from the norm than
infertility in younger women and that thereby older women have less need for ART.
A “normal functioning range” conception of need underpins this argument, with the
normal range being identified with fertility naturally declining with female age.

Conclusion
We have aimed to illuminate conceptual terrain relevant to the question of whether
ART public funding should feature a female age limit. We have conceptualised that
question as one of justice in resource allocation and explored arguments for and
against a female age limit with reference to three much-debated substantive principles
of justice, namely the capacity to benefit, personal responsibility, and need. Our
exploration of arguments has included exploring differing conceptions of these
principles. We have arrived at the following conclusions:


Capacity-to-benefit arguments are limited by difficulties in conceptualising
ART’s benefit and by a lack of data on ART’s age-relative risks of harm,
which might be taken to offset benefits.



As such, there are no clear cost-effectiveness grounds for an age limit when
older women still bear some capacity to benefit by ART.



Personal responsibility arguments are challenged by structural determinants of
delayed motherhood or, in other words, system factors that may function as
risk factors for delayed motherhood.



Need arguments are capable of speaking both for and against some female age
restriction depending on the conception of need used.

We conclude by formulating a series of questions with which the question of ART
resource allocation might be equated:


Should ART public funding vary according to people’s capacity to benefit?
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o If so, then at what point? When should ART be considered costineffective relative to other forms of health care? When should ART be
considered not merely cost-ineffective but futile and therein more
harmful than beneficial?


Should ART public funding vary according to a person’s degree of
responsibility for one’s own infertility?



Should ART public funding vary according to need?
o If so, then when is one need greater than another? In other words, what
constitutes need? Does a person’s need depend on how disrupted one’s
health is, how important one’s threatened opportunity is, how severe or
urgent one’s problem is, or some combination?



Is female age relevant in determining and comparing (1) people’s capacity to
benefit from ART, (2) people’s degree of personal responsibility for their
infertility, and (3) people’s degree of need? If so, then in what respects and to
what degree? What attributes might be relevant besides female age, and how
relatively important are they?



How relatively important are the capacity to benefit, personal responsibility,
and need as substantive principles of justice (in other words, bases on which to
allocate resources)? What other principles, if any, are important, and how
relatively important are they?

We have attempted to demonstrate the central relevance of these questions and to
canvass tenable responses to a number of them. The concepts of capacity to benefit,
personal responsibility, and need can differ not only in content, but also in what
relative importance they are accorded in just resource allocation. Wide variation in
ART public funding policy might be better understood in this light: The variation may
well reflect differing conceptions of justice with respect to resource allocation. These
differing conceptions can be observed when comparing some of the more transparent
ART public funding policies. The relevance of these matters extends beyond ART.
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Figure 1. Outcomes of IVF cycles by female age group, Australia and New
Zealand, 2008 (Wang, Chambers, and Sullivan 2010). Autologous success rates
decline with female age.
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The age group of the oocyte recipient, not donor, is plotted.
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